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Abstract: The prevalence of smart devices in our day-to-day activities increases the potential threat to
our secret information. To counter these threats like unauthorized access and misuse of phones, only
authorized users should be able to access the device. Authentication mechanism provide a secure way
to safeguard the physical resources as well the information that is processed. Text-based passwords
are the most common technique used for the authentication of devices, however, they are vulnerable
to a certain type of attacks such as brute force, smudge and shoulder surfing attacks. Graphical
Passwords (GPs) were introduced as an alternative for the conventional text-based authentication
to overcome the potential threats. GPs use pictures and have been implemented in smart devices
and workstations. Psychological studies reveal that humans can recognize images much easier and
quicker than numeric and alphanumeric passwords, which become the basis for creating GPs. In this
paper a novel Fractal-Based Authentication Technique (FBAT) has been proposed by implementing a
Sierpinski triangle. In the FBAT scheme, the probability of password guessing is low making system
resilient against abovementioned threats. Increasing fractal level makes the system stronger and
provides security against attacks like shoulder surfing.
Keywords: Authentication; shoulder surfing; graphical password scheme; fractal; Sierpinski triangle;
smart devices
PACS: J0101
1. Introduction
Smart devices have become an intrinsic part of modern life. These devices store our sensitive
information like Personal Identification Numbers (PINs), contact details, pictures, important
documents, and financial information [1]. Such information needs to be protected to provide security
and privacy to the user. A consumer report in the USA revealed that 34% of smart device users either
use simple code to lock their devices or have no security mechanism at all. The report further says that
36% users use a basic lock for the security of their phone (4-digit PIN lock) [2]. It has been observed
from real-time events that many text-based passwords are not enough and can be easily breached to
access sensitive data. For example, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that Superdrug
online store [3], last.fm [4] and Ticketmaster [5] in the United Kingdom (UK) had all suffered from
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password breaches, therefore, sensitive data remain vulnerable [2]. User authentication is considered a
first step to prevent a data breach.
Different authentication schemes are proposed in the literature for data protection. Among them,
the most commonly used traditional password technique is text-based password authentication [2].
This scheme is preferred because password combinations are easy to remember and can be converted
into any unique password combination through exchange protocols [6]. It can consist of public
parameters like name, family name, city name, children name, a PIN, date of birth (DoB), the first six
letters of common English type-writer/keyboard (QWERTY) or commonly used words, etc. However,
this scheme is vulnerable to dictionary attacks, brute force attacks, and guessing attacks [7]. To protect
their devices against these attacks, end-users are recommended to use lengthy and complex passwords
with combinations of letters and numerals, e.g., upper-case as well as lower-case letters, numbers, and
special characters. Complex passwords are usually lengthy and difficult to remember; therefore, users
tend to write them down on paper, save them in Google accounts for future logins or in an electronic
file, which increases the risk of theft that will lead to security breaches [2].
To overcome the issue of complex passwords, various graphical password (GPs) schemes were
proposed in the literature [8,9]. The GPs like Passface [10], Passhint [11], etc. makes the smartphones
more compatible rather than the traditional ones as they provide a large symbol space over text-based
password techniques. Therefore, they are being adopted in smart devices [2]. Research revealed that
users pay more attention to technology which is easy to use [12]. The GPs schemes consist of images
and icons. Users must select images or icons from the pool of images to create a password. These
selected images and icons will be used for password authentication. Despite these benefits, all the
present graphical schemes are still vulnerable to different attacks, e.g., brute force attacks, shoulder
surfing, and smudge attacks [1].
Although GPs provides advantages over text-based password as a user does not need to remember
long passwords, it is based on images and patterns, etc., besides that, most of the GPs use a limited
password space that helps attackers in using brute force to break them [13]. Though GPs help
in improving security, they are however still vulnerable to shoulder surfing, which is defined as”
password observation by glancing over the shoulder or by eavesdropping on private conversations” [2]
as shown in Figure 1a. It is the most common method of stealing a password in a crowded place, as it
is easy to stand right next to a smartphone user [14]. Another mechanism for accessing passwords is
by recording through high definition cameras while a user is entering a password on a smart device [2].
To overcome the drawbacks of GPs, user scan use pattern-based authentication schemes [1]. These
were introduced to overcome shoulder surfing. However, a pattern-based authentication scheme is
also vulnerable to smudge attacks, another prominent type of attack described in the literature [13],
which is defined as “oily residue left on the screen used to crack passwords“ [2], shown in Figure 1b.
Whenever the user enters the password, smudges or oily residues remain on the display helping the
attacker easily determine the passwords by viewing the smudges on the screen at a different angle,
e.g., 60◦ [13]. Therefore, eliminating smudge attacks is considered difficult. With different light angles
or camera angles, an attacker can identify the smudges on the screen, which will help them unlock
the password patterns. A study shows that there is a68% chance that an attacker will fully unlock a
device and a 98% chances of partial unlocking [13]. Most of the currently proposed GPs are vulnerable
and do not tackle the attacks explained in Section 2. Therefore, finding a solution to these attacks is
still an active research area. For the security of sensitive information and data, it is recommended that
users follow several password creation rules recommended by various researchers for authentication
purposes [15–17]. Some of the popular password creation rules are as follows:
(1) A password should have at least eight characters as this will increase the password space
explained in Ref. [15] i.e., password keys with the difficulty in breaching it.
(2) Words found in a dictionary should not be used in password creation because of their common
nature. They are widely employed by users and can be easily breached by making the password weak.
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(3) A majority of users either write down their password or save them in the cloud which will increase
the risk of cracking. Therefore, a password should not be saved or written down anywhere, which
will create complexity and difficulty for the attackers to breach it.
(4) Changing passwords periodically will increase password strength. For example, if someone is
observing users’ fora long time particularly close friends of users, they might get familiar with the
same password. Therefore, changing the password periodically will increase the password security.
(5) A password generated randomly will be considered as a strong password. It is because the
user usually selects common keywords or patterns for security purposes. Random password
generation helps the user in creating complex passwords which might be a combination of
alphanumeric words or random images with strong security parameters.
(6) Every system or account should be protected with a different password, so if an attacker is
successful in cracking one password, he will not be able to breach other accounts.
For the purpose of ease of remembrance, users often ignore these rules, which results in password
risk. Therefore, the password should not contain publicly known parameters and must follow the
password generation rules.
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In this research paper, we propose a novel FBAT based on Sierpinski triangles. We have developed
this technique with a combination of graphical and pattern-based schemes. It consists of various levels
and at each level, the user must select a triangle with a color combination to create a password as
shown in Figure 2. The proposed technique is helpful in avoiding password breaches, as it is stronger
than traditional text-based passwords or PIN numbers; similarly, this technique creates complexity for
breaching the password because of the reduced probability of successfully breaching the password,
as explained in Section 4. Simulation results proved that the proposed scheme is resilient to (i) brute
force attack, (ii) shoulder surfing and (iii) smudge attack and much stronger than traditional text-based
password and 4-digit PIN password. FBAT also proved the ease of use during password creation and
login phase.
This paper is divided into the following sections: A detailed introduction of our research idea
and problems is give in Section 1. Related work supporting our problem is described in Section 2.
The proposed FBAT scheme based on Sierpinski triangles to mitigate the problems of shoulder surfing,
brute force and smudge attacks is briefly discussed in Section 3.A systematic analysis is conducted in
order to evaluate the usability and memorability of the system from the user perspective in Section 4.
Practical implementation and evaluation of the proposed technique with the help of a user study
is presented in Section 4. Results obtained from the user study are briefly discussed is Section 5.
A security analysis with respect to the existing techniques is performed in Section 7. Finally, paper is
concluded with the outcomes of the proposed technique in Section 8.
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2. Related Work
Passwords are used to secure the data saved on smart devices [2]. Users either employ traditional
password techniques like text-based password or graphical password (GPs) schemes for securing
their private data [15]. Based on this an extensive number of GPs has been proposed in the literature.
The concept for GPs was introduced because of the quicker recognition of graphical images rather than
traditional passwords by human beings [2]. GPs are divided into four categories: (i) pure recall-based
schemes, (ii) recognition-based schemes, (iii) cued recall-based schemes, and iv) hybrid schemes [18].
Pure recall base schemes are defined as “repetition of registered drawings known as drawn metric
system” [19]. Few examples of pure recall base schemes are Draw-A-Secret (DAS) [19], pass-go [20]
and Android Pattern Lock (APL) [21]. Hybrid schemes like VibraPass [22] and VAP Code [2] are
“a combination of multiple authentication schemes” [2]. However, our proposed novel graphical
pattern-based scheme is a combination of recognition and cued recall-based schemes. Therefore, in
this paper, we focus only on recognition-based and cued recall-based schemes.
2.1. Recognition-Based Scheme
In a recognition-bas d scheme, a user must recognize presel cted series of images which are used
to create a password. R cognition-based schem s are easy to member and easy to i entify by the
user. On the other hand, the system efficiency is reduced by the need to process a la ger set of images
or icons, e.g., 1000 or more [15].
The graphical techniques work by selecting different images or i ons from a database for creating
a a sword. The user must remember the s lected images during the authent cation phase. Some
of the r cognition-based schemes are elaborated in this section. In Ref. [10], the authors proposed
the P sFaces technique that uses a human face verification technique for login. In this scheme, the
user has to select a number of images in the password creation process. While in the login phase the
user must tap the selected image from among several decoy images. The drawback of this scheme is
the atural inclination to select faces based on cultural, race or gender preferences. The idea of [10]
was ext nded by [23] through cha ging the concept of images to stories. In this scheme, the user
m t select routin images instead of a human fac in a story formation such th t selected images
will appear in the sequence in which it was captured. This sequence of images will make a story of
that event from which images were taken. Howev , the drawback of this technique is that users
may select family events or university or sc ool ife events which may be familiar o their friends.
In Ref. [11], r searchers propo ed th P sshint auth nt cation sys em, in this scheme, the ser has to
select four im ges and then create a hint for them in the registration phase. In the authentication phase,
ints will be used to recognize the targeted images among 15 decoy images. The limitation of this
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scheme is that a user must memorize pictures as well as hints for recognition of the password which
increases the login time. In Ref. [7], the author proposed a text-based graphical password scheme
where the user selects five images from among sixteen random images. Displayed random images
are a combination of graphical and text-based images which are used to create a password. The login
phase of this scheme consists of a 4 × 3 grid, in which the last vertical grid is continuously moving.
When the selected image in the moving grid is aligned with the other two selected images in the static
grid, then the user will tap on the image to unlock the device. The wait time for the alignment of
images in this scheme results in an increased login time.
2.2. Cued recall-based Scheme
In cued recall-based graphical scheme, users must click on some pre-selected points on given
images to unlock the password. The graphical password technique was first proposed by Blonder in
1996 [24]. In his technique, users have to click on an already defined location on an image. It is done for
the authentication of the users. The Blonder technique as extended in Ref. [14]is known as a PassPoint
system. This system gives free hand to users to click anywhere on the picture to create their password.
Research conducted by [25] proposed a cued click point technique. In this technique, the user clicks on
one point per image in the sequence of images. Password generated in this technique was generated
on clicking different images which were shown in a sequence. This study reports higher security than
PassPoint. As discussed, the aforementioned literature schemes are vulnerable to smudge, shoulder
surfing and brute force attacks, either fully or partially.
Generally, users use a simple text-based password with common keywords or graphical
passwords with personal images which can be easily tracked or observed by the attacker creating
security breach issues. Therefore, our proposed FBAT will overcome the issues of both text-based
password and graphical passwords. FBAT will use the concept of the recognition-based scheme and
cued recall-based scheme. The user will recognize their selected colored triangle and then will use the
concept of the cued recall-based scheme for clicking on the pre-selected triangle on each level. Hence,
our proposed scheme will provide better resilience against shoulder surfing, smudge and brute force
attacks as compared to other techniques.
3. Proposed Methodology
The methodology section explains the proposed technique, i.e., FBAT, it is developed in order
to mitigate the attacks that might breach the security of smart devices, e.g., shoulder surfing, brute
force and smudge attacks, by combining the benefits of recognition-based and cued recall-based
authentication schemes.
Our proposed graphical authentication scheme is known as FBAT. In the FBAT scheme a pattern
is generated using fractals, i.e., Sierpinski triangles, also called Sierpinski gaskets or Sierpinski sieves,
as shown in Figure 2. The FBAT scheme is based on a repetition of triangles. In the Sierpinski triangle,
a selected pattern with the help of a color scheme is saved in the device storage which is then retrieved
from the device storage during the authentication phase. Level 1 of FBAT comprises four equilateral
triangles inscribed in it. Three of them are solid triangles and one is empty. We can also describe it as
removing the center triangle or putting an empty triangle in the center which will create three more
equilateral triangles.
As shown in Figure 2, there is Level 0 which is only one triangle. When we remove the triangle
from the center, it will give three more triangles like in Level 1. This makes a total of four triangles,
three filled black color triangles and one empty one. If we keep on removing triangles from the filled
triangle, then we move to Level 2. In Level 2 there are nine triangles in black and four empty triangles.
However, our concern is with filled triangles. If we keep putting an empty triangle in every black
triangle, then the levels will keep on increasing. Level 3 has 27 filled triangles. The number of triangles
increases by 3n (n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , n) where n is the level. At the 4th level, there would be 34 = 81
triangles, at the 5th level 35 = 243 triangles, and this value will keep on increasing with rising level.
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This is known as the password space. It is defined as “number of password arrangements presented for
use by users in a system” [14]. We can calculate password space through
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3.1. Registration of Pattern
The registration process is explained in Figure 3 with the help of a sequence diagram and the
workings of the technique for registration can be found in Algorithm 1. The notations used in the
pseudo code are explained in Table 2. In the registration phase, the user must select the pattern which
they want to use as a password in our developed prototype with the help of colored triangles. These
selected color triangles of each level will be considered as a password, which user has to memorize for
the authentication phase.
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Algorithm 1. Registration Phase of FBAT
1: Draw a GUI in function
2: Initialize
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Ю             Object of string pattern 
ς               R  attempt variable 
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5: L1++
6: If
7: Wrong selection← {L1}
8: Retry
9: Return L1
10: Else
11: Select triangle← {L2}
12: Pattern saved←
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Table 2. Notations. 
Ю             Object of string pattern 
ς               Re attempt variable 
ϸ               Pattern Variable 
13: L2++
14: Endif
15: Wrong selection← {L2}
16: Retry
17: Return {L2}
18: Else
19: Triangle selection← {L3}
20: Data saved←
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Table 2. Notations. 
Ю             Object of string pattern 
ς               Re attempt variable 
ϸ               Pattern Variable 
21: Endif
22: Wrong selection← {L3}
23: Retry
24: Return {L3}
25: Else
26: Continue for confirmation
27: Endif
28: Repeat L1 to L3
29: Confirm
30: If
31: Set password == confirm password
32: Password set
33: Password saved← ∂
34: endif
We have fixed the number of Sierpinski levels at three because of limited screen size, as seen in
Figure 4, because with higher levels, the area of triangles will keep reducing and that may lead to fat
finger problems, as it is a property of the Sierpinski triangle that when the level increases, the area of
each triangle reduces, and perimeter increases. Therefore, we don’t recommend increasing the levels
of Sierpinski triangles in handheld devices as they have limited screen size. Hence FBAT is fixed to
Level 3 in handheld devices. However, Sierpinski triangles above Level 3 could be implemented in a
device where the screen size is larger than 10 inches.
Password creation using FBAT is explained with the help of few steps which are explained here:
(1) Level 1: In this step, the level appears in front of the user as shown in Figure 4a. It consists of
three colored and one empty triangle. Here the user selects one colored triangle from n (i.e., 3)
numbers of triangles. At this stage, the selection probability of a password is 0.3333 as seen in
Equation (1).
(2) Level 2: In the second step, a new level appears and Level 1 disappears, as shown in Figure 4b.
It consists of nine colored triangles. At this stage, the user selects one triangle from n (i.e., 9)
number of triangles, with a probability of 0.037037 as shown in Equation (2).
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(3) Level 3: In the third step, a level appears, and Level 2 disappears as shown in Figure 4c. This
level consists of 27 colored triangles. As done in the previous steps, the user selects one colored
triangle from among n (i.e., 27) triangles with a probability of 0.001371 as shown in Equation (3).
Sequence of performing authentication is elaborated in sequence diagram in Figure 5. After this
level, the user presses the confirm button which saves the pattern as shown in Figure 6a.
(4) The user repeats these steps to confirm the password as seen in Figure 6b. After confirmation of
the pattern, it was set.
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3.2. Authentication
The pattern which was created and stored in the registration phase is used in the authentication
phase. In this phase, the user has to select the pattern in order to authenticate himself. However, all
the colored triangles in every phase will randomly shuffle themselves, so that the colored pattern
that was created during the password creation phase will not appear on same place at which it was
during registration phase. The user will select the pattern which was created during password creation
from levels 1, 2 a d 3. Each time the user selects a triangle from the given pattern, the current level
will disappear, and a new pattern level will appear. Soon after completing the correct pattern, the
device will unlock itself. On failure, the user will be redirected to Level 1 as shown in Figure 6c. Five
conti uous failed attempts will lock the device. The flowchart for the authentication phase is defined
in Figure 5. The working of th auth ntication is explaine in the algorithm below.
Algorithm 2. Authentication Phase of FBAT
1: Draw a GUI in function
2: Init alize
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Table 2. Notations. 
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ϸ               Pattern Variable 
3: Initialize σ
4: Select triangle {L1}
5: Pattern saved
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Table 2. Notations. 
Ю             Object of string pattern 
ς               Re attempt variable 
ϸ               Pattern Variable 
6: L1++
7: Select triangle {L2}
8: Pattern saved
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Table 2. Notations. 
Ю             Object of string pattern 
ς               Re attempt variable 
ϸ             Pattern Variable 
12: if
13: Pattern value = = saved value
14: Unlock
15: Else
16: Error message
17: Retry
18: ς ++
19: if
20: ς ++ ≥ 5
21: Timer set == 30 s
22: endif
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4. System Analysis
Our novel technique provides strong resilience against brute force, shoulder suffering and
guessing attacks. Because of its large password space and complexity levels, it is very difficult for
machines or human beings to break this combination.
The multiplication rule of probability says that “the probability that events A and B both occur is
equal to the probability that event A occurs times the probability that event B occurs, given that A has
occurred”. Because it works in a manner that, first we select triangle from Level 1 then 2 and 3 and
so on. In this case first event that is a selection of a triangle in level one occurs, and after that second
event that is a selection of a triangle from level two will occur. This will continue until the password
is created. According to the rule of multiplication of probability P(A∩B) = P(A)P(A|B) we have the
following equations:
P(Level1) = 1/3 = 0.3333 (1)
P(Level2) = 1/3 × 1/9 = 0.037037 (2)
P(Level3) = 1/3 × 1/9 × 1/27 = 0.001371 (3)
P(Success) = 0.13% & P(Failure) = 0.87% (3)
P(Level4) = 1/3 × 1/9 × 1/27 × 1/81 = 0.000016935 (4)
P(Success) = 0.0016935% & P(Failure) = 0.9983065% (4)
From Equation (3) we can see that for Level 3 there are 0.13% chances that an attacker will guess
the password and when we proceed to Level 4 as shown in Equation (4), the probability value will
decrease drastically, as for this level probability is 0.0016935% and it will keep on decreasing as the
number of levels increases. With this less probability of success, there is extremely little chance that an
attacker will guess the pattern. Therefore, this technique provides strong security against brute force,
guessing and shoulder surfing attacks by using a very large password space.
5. Implementation and User Study
A prototype of the fractal-based graphical pattern, i.e., Sierpinski triangles, was implemented on
the Android system. Although these devices have small screen sizes (which forces us to limit our levels
to four in this study), this graphical pattern is not limited to Android devices, and it can be extended to
any devices like Windows 8 ones, tablets, ATM machines, laptops, and personal computer locks, where
authentication is required to operate the device. Since many handheld devices are powered by the
Android operating system, therefore, we have developed and implemented our mechanism, i.e., FBAT
on Android-based devices like smartphones. Usability tests have been conducted on different users’
Android phones after installing the application of the proposed technique to evaluate its usability and
memorability. In this section, we discuss the implementation of FBAT on Android devices and the case
study carried out on the same by describing the construction of the Sierpinski triangles, experimental
design, participants, procedure and environment for the user study.
5.1. Implementation
Our Sierpinski triangle prototype was implemented with the Android SDK 4.0.3 Ice Cream
Sandwich OS and API level 15. After developing a prototype, it was installed on users’ devices for
further study.
5.2. Case Study
This section will discuss our user study, which includes experimental design, participants,
procedure and environment for the study.
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5.2.1. Experimental Design
A real-time survey was conducted for evaluating the memorability and usability of FBAT:
(1) Memorability: This is the property which will determine how well a user will remember the
created password. Will, they log in successfully after a period from registration or not?
(2) Usability: User experience was measured on the Sierpinski triangle, which includes successful
login time, the time consumed during registration and login and the time used to reset in the
registration and authentication phase.
During the experiment, 30 participants from various domains were invited and were asked to
register their password in our scheme. Then they were asked to log in to the device after a week.
Login after five attempts was considered as a failure. This number of the participant were selected
as research [17] has shown that data from 30 users will be enough for an analysis. The usability of
the proposed scheme was checked by calculating the registration and login time that each participant
takes. It was performed to check whether our proposed scheme is time-consuming or not. The detailed
procedure for collecting the results is described in Section 4 and the collected results are given in
Section 6.
5.2.2. Environment
The FBAT scheme was installed on users’ Android phones for the user study. However, the
prototype was 1st tested on a Huawei P9 with a display size of 5.2 inches and 1080 × 1920 pixels
resolution. This device had Android 7.0 (Nougat) version at the time of usability study of the prototype.
5.2.3. Participant
Details of the participants are given in Table 3. Demographic information was collected using a
questionnaire. The results show that there were 30 participants as prior studies did [17]. Participants
were not familiar with the proposed technique, i.e., fractal-based graphical patterns or any other
graphical pattern. The study group consisted of 5 university professors. 10 participants who were
assistant professors (AP) and 15 lecturers. The majority of the lecturers and APs were selected from
among non-computing-related departments because faculty members of the Computer Science and
Information Technology (CS & IT) departments were considered technically strong and might have
prior experience with graphical pattern techniques. As Table 3 shows, three professors were from the
Biochemistry and Zoology department and two from CS & IT department with a specialization in
human-computer interaction and information systems. Similarly, seven APs were from non-computing
departments and three were from CS & IT departments. Ten lecturers were from science departments
and five were from CS & IT.
Table 3. Demographic Information.
Demographic Information Category Frequency Percentage
Gender
Male 17 56.66%
Female 13 43.33%
Age
25–30 18 60.00%
30–35 5 16.66%
35–40 2 6.66%
Above 40 5 16.66%
Designation
Professor 5 16.66%
Assistant
Professor 10 33.33%
Lecturer 15 50.00%
Department Computing 10 33.33%
Non-computing 20 66.66%
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5.2.4. Procedure
This subsection will describe how the study was conducted in our experimental session:
(1) Introduction: In this phase, participants were explained the purpose of the study and a basic
idea of fractal-based authentication. They were also shown an animation of using the proposed
scheme so that they will get a better idea about it.
(2) Registration: In this phase, participants created a pattern while sitting in a private place to ensure
safety during pattern creation. They were instructed in an introduction phase about password
creation. Then told about selecting a triangle at each level using a color combination. Instructions
were given to repeat the pattern to ensure the pattern, which will further save while pressing the
confirm button. Instructions about retries were also given and during the registration phase, the
user may click the retry button to change their chosen pattern.
(3) Login phase: After creating the pattern, participants were asked to log in or authenticate
themselves on the system. They must follow the same pattern or sequence of triangles which
they have selected during password creation.
Results are summarized in Table 3 above.
6. Results
The effectiveness of the proposed system was measured through a real-time survey and security
analysis. The result representation theme is based on accuracy and usability. In this study, the
perspective of accuracy is measured by the successful login rate and usability is measured with the
average time spent on each fractal level. Result interpretation shows that proposed fractal-based
pattern is practical to use in our daily life.
6.1. Accuracy
As mentioned earlier, accuracy is the successful login rate of the participants with the proposed
scheme. As defined, successful login rate will be considered only if participants can successfully
authenticate themselves within five attempts, otherwise it will be declared as a failure. We measure
accuracy at two levels. Accuracy at first attempt is measuring ∑ f a . as in Equation (5), whereas, the
total accuracy, which includes both i.e., first attempt and attempts up to five levels is measured by
∑t_att . as seen in Equation (6):
∑
f a
=
∑sat .
∑t_att .
(5)
∑
t_acc
=
∑t_Satt .
∑t_att .
(6)
where ∑ f a = accuracy at first attempt, ∑sat = successful logins at first attempt, ∑t_att = total number
of attempts, ∑t_Satt = total successful attempts and ∑t_acc = total accuracy.
Table 4 below shows the results of the 30 participants who logged in successfully on the first
attempt and their total login accuracy. The results depict that the percentage of total accuracy and
accuracy of the first attempt is higher in the first session than the second session, as 29 out of 30
(96.66%) participants were able to log in successfully at the first attempt. Total accuracy was assumed
to be 100% in the first session. It is because at that time they created a pattern and it was fresh in their
mind, which helped them to log in at the first attempt. After a period of one week, participants were
requested to use the application again with the same pattern which they created in the first session to
unlock the device. Surprisingly, the results showed that 28 out of 30 (93.33%) participants were able to
log in successfully. It includes 21 (70%) participants who logged in at the first attempt and six out of
30 (20%) who logged in after more than one attempt. Three participants (10%) took more than five
attempts to log into the device. When we asked the participants about the extra attempts to login, they
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told that clicking on the triangles confused them because of the random motion of colors used in the
pattern. They also stated that as information regarding bank account numbers etc. is confidential, and
we used a complex pattern for this, it in turn increased the number of attempts required to crack the
system. However, if we discuss the average successful login attempts of an individual person, it can
be stated that the average single person took 3.8s for unlocking the device during the login phase.
However, a few of the participants like those who were above 40 years of age took 6.1, 5.2,4.9, 7 and 5 s
to unlock them. According to them, it was because three of the professors were above 55 years of age
and they had weak eyesight issues and two of them selected a complex password.
Table 4. Authentication accuracy in two sessions.
First Attempt Between 1–5 Attempts >5 Attempts
Login (1st time) 100%
Login (after week) 70% 20% 10%
Hence, from the survey results, it was concluded that the proposed FBAT is much easier to
remember and use, besides its usability and memorability, it is difficult to breach for accessing the
user’s confidential information. Users showed a positive response toward the usage, memorability
and security strength of the FBAT and they highly appreciated the security parameters, i.e., random
movement of color combinations and the level selection during password creation.
6.2. Usability
We calculated the total time consumed for successful login and registration to find the usability of
our Sierpinski triangle pattern.
Total time consumed at registration and login phase is shown in Table 5. The average time
consumed by the participants at registration was almost 1 min and 25 s. Average registration time is
a bit lengthy. According to the survey conducted among the participants, it was found that 75% of
participants said that the registration process is very easy. However, the rest of the participants said
that they forgot to press the confirm button at the end of the registration, which results in an increased
registration time. During the registration phase, participants have to select triangles from the pattern
along with color combination, which they have to remember for the login session. After registration,
participants were asked for authentication. Data collected from the participants shows that 45.5 s
were required to log in to the device. As participants were not familiar with this technique, therefore,
it results in extra time. However, participants were asked to use this pattern as a lock for a week.
After the specific time of one week, participants were requested to participate in an experiment. Data
collected after a week was surprising. As shown in Table 3. It revealed that, after continuous usage of
one week, time for login reduced to 20.3 s. In the third phase, that was conducted after 2 weeks, again,
data were collected from the participants. The result was surprising in that time consumed for the
login session after two weeks was drastically reduced to 4.4 s. It will keep on reducing after spending
a little bit extra time on the pattern and 79% of the participants said that spending a little bit extra time
on the registration phase was worthwhile if the authentication scheme will help in the protection of
passwords from the shoulder surfing technique.
Table 5. Average time in seconds at login and registration phase.
Registration (Reg.)/Login
Mean Median S. D
Total Time (s) Reg. 85.4 60.3 40.57
Total Time (s) Login (1st) 45.4 55.5 31.6
Total Time (s) Login (2nd) 20.3 16.2 9.5
Total Time (s) Login (3rd) 4.4 2.33 1.45
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7. Security Analysis
This section will discuss the security analysis of our proposed authentication system i.e., FBAT
against attacks like shoulder surfing and brute force attacks by comparing with existing techniques
used for overcoming these attacks.
Comparisons of FBAT with existing techniques like Mod 10 [26], STL method [27], FC method [28],
BW method [29]and MobSecure [30] were used to perform the analysis in the context of security, login
average time, unlock percentage in brute force context and password space. Password space states the
total combination of keys used for creating the password. The results represent the password space of
FBAT up to Level 4 like other techniques. Security and usability in the context of authentication, ease
of use and remembering of the pattern were considered as a priority in comparative analysis. Hence,
according to Table 6, it can be deduced that FBAT is robust and strong in all selected scales used for
comparisons, i.e., average login time, unlocking percentage and password space.
Table 6. Comparative analysis of Mod 10, STL, BW, FC and MobSecure with FBAT.
Techniques Resilient Against Average LoginTime
Percentage of
Error to Unlock
Password
Space
Mod 10 Strong Adversary 9.2 16.66 104
STL Strong Adversary 13.41 9.09 104
BW Weak adversary 19.5 9.09 104
FC Weak adversary 20.31 13.04 104
MobSecure Weak adversary 20.31 13.04 104
FBAT Strong adversary 4.4 1.6935 × 10−5 814
7.1. Breaching FBAT
To check the breaching strength of FBAT, if it exists, multiple experiments were conducted by
dividing our participants into three different teams, Alpha, Beta, and Gamma. Each team has ten
randomly selected members. Random member from team Alpha were selected to create a password
by selecting one level of FBAT. Similarly, members of the Beta team created a password by selecting
two levels of FBAT and members of the Gamma team created a password by selecting three levels of
FBAT. Password creation activity was performed in full isolation. Each member created a password
by selecting color combinations within FBAT. Every time, the color changed randomly whenever it
the authentication step is entered. In order to check the strength of patterns in every aspect, after ten
attempts by each team member, e.g., Alpha, Beta, and Gamma, the pattern was then swapped among
all teams such that, all team members will get a chance to crack the passwords of each level i.e., Level 1,
Level 2 and Level 3. Participants were asked to identify/crack the pattern.
Feedback from the participants was collected, and it showed that no one was able to crack the
passwords at levels2 and 3. However, at Level 1, three members from team Alpha, three members from
team Beta and three members from team Gamma were successful in cracking the password. Hence, we
infer from the analysis that Level 2 can be used in situations where minimal security is required and
for scenarios that require high-security, users are recommended to use a maximum level password.
It can be seen from the analysis that each participant had a maximum number of attempts to crack the
password, but they were still successful in cracking the password at Level 1. This is because, according
to the Equation (2) there were 3.7% chances that an attacker will crack the password. However, our
proposed technique still has better security, because when the attacker tries to breach the pattern, after
5th attempt, FBAT will disable the pattern for 30 s due to which all the patterns which the attacker
remembers will by fully shuffled creating more difficulty to the attacker.
In the experimental phase, there were nine participants in each group and each participant had
thirty chances to crack the password at each level (i.e., ten at Level 1, ten at Level 2, ten at Level 3).
Hence, every team had 270 guessing attacks to crack the password at all levels as shown in Table 7.
Three members of team Alpha cracked the password at the 7th, 6th and 7th attempt, three members
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of team Beta guessed the password at the 5th, 8th and 6th attempt and three members of team
Gamma identified the level 1password after the 7th, 5th and 9th attempt. Those participants who
were successful in cracking the password at level 1, did not need the remaining attempts. Therefore,
subtracting those attempts results in a total of 250 attempts at Level 1.
Table 7. Breach Complexity of FBAT.
Levels Total Attempts Unsuccessful Attempts Successful Attempts
Level 1 270 241 9
Level 2 270 270 0
Level 3 270 270 0
Our proposed technique was further tested against the possible threats like shoulder surfing,
smudge attack, and brute force attack. These attacks are further explained below.
7.2. Shoulder Surfing
Shoulder surfing is a real threat to any kind of authentication system like graphical or textual-based
password authentication schemes. To protect against this attack, a lot of new authentication techniques
were proposed for protecting the system from different attacks. However, most of the proposed schemes
do not overcome this attack, if shoulder surfing is done using camera recording. For example, proposed
techniques like spying resistant keyboards [31,32] and PIN-entry methods [29] are based on the issues of
short-term memory difficulties. The camera-based technique can easily be used to crack the passwords
of these schemes in a shoulder surfing attack.
The proposed Sierpinski triangle-based technique (i.e., FBAT) used for authentication process
helps in overcoming shoulder surfing attacks. In the proposed scheme, the user created a password by
selecting different triangles with the help of color combinations. In every stage of the authentication,
besides the one color triangle that was selected as a password, all the other triangles will be decoy
triangles in a big triangle. Color combinations randomly shuffle in every stage of the password
authentication depending on which user opted for a triangle of relevant color which was used during
the password creation phase. Random movement of colored triangles in every phase of authentication
forces the user to select their relevant triangle in a big triangle. Furthermore, the login indicator for
each Sierpinski triangle varies because of the randomness of the color scheme. Therefore, touching
an area on the screen also changes at every stage. However, besides the random movement of color
triangles, the increase in levels at every stage of FBAT reduces the area of each triangle and increases
the perimeter. Therefore, due to the random movement of colors and reduction in area of triangles the
size of the patterns becomes small, due to which, while selecting the pattern, the maximum triangles
beneath the thumb or finger are hidden, which makes FBAT secure against shoulder surfing. Table 6
represents that the password space at Level 4is much higher in FBAT as compared to other techniques
used for the comparisons and the password space will keep on increasing with the increase in levels.
7.3. Smudge Attack
Residues left on the screen are known as a smudge. Therefore, attacks based on this feature are
known as smudge attacks [13]. The attacker tries to capture sensitive information by observing the
smudges left on the screen by the recent users. In the proposed FBAT scheme, the triangles on each
level increase with the random combination of colors. Smudges can reveal the passwords effectively
only in pattern-based approaches, If the password is PIN-based then the accuracy of smudges will
be reduced. Therefore, due to the random nature of colors in FBAT, the user will have to hit the
triangles on different locations on the screen. This will produce a maximum smudge on the screen
at a different location because of the randomness of the colors in the pattern. Hence, the amount of
smudge left by the user on the screen will not provide any useful information to the attacker because
of the randomness of the login indicator.
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7.4. Brute force Attack
Checking all possible combinations for cracking a password is known as a brute force attack [1,33,34].
It is performed until and unless attackers become successful in cracking the password. Our proposed
technique has a very low possibility for cracking the pattern. As Equation (3) explains there is only a
0.13% chance of cracking the password. However, if we increase the level of the Sierpinski triangle,
password complexity will increase by the Equation (4), i.e., 0.0016935%, and the complexity will keep
on increasing by increasing the level of the technique. Passwords are created by the combination of
different colors. Hence, selecting different color combinations during brute force attempts will be
another challenge because of the random motion of colors. Our two-pattern detection, i.e., selecting
accurate triangles with accurate colors will reduce the cracking attempts at each level, as the attacker
has to make combine accurate color and accurate triangle selection at every stage. Brute force attack
is considered the most challenging technique. However, only a limited number of attempts will be
available for cracking the password. After five attempts, the account will be blocked. To unlock the
account, the user will have to enter the secret PIN number. Therefore, our proposed technique will
overcome all the challenges that occurred in security.
8. Conclusions
With the increasing trend of smart devices, i.e., wireless technology and mobile apps, etc. people
started moving toward them. Ubiquitous computing helps access different applications anytime and
anywhere. Therefore, users have started using those applications to save their confidential information
in them, e.g., account numbers, passwords and personal pictures. Hence these digital devices need
some sort of authentication system, to protect their valuable information. However, the authentication
process in public is still vulnerable to shoulder surfing attacks. Even the complicated passwords can
be cracked through shoulder surfing. Usually, users secure their devices using a textual password or
PIN number. However, these traditional techniques are vulnerable.
To overcome shoulder surfing, brute force and smudge attacks, this study proposed a novel
technique based on fractal i.e., Sierpinski triangle. Due to the property of Sierpinski triangles, their
size will keep on reducing by increasing the levels and randomness of colors will give no clue to the
attacker for cracking it. Complexity level of FBAT scheme keeps on increasing by increasing the levels
of fractal. Experimental results indicate that total accuracy of login attempts after a period of one week
is 93.33% as described in the accuracy section earlier. However, from the perspective of usability, the
total time consumed in login attempts at the registration phase and its mean is 85.4 s whereas, the
login time was reduced drastically with a mean of4.4 s by the third attempt.
Hence, according to the results, it is considered that the proposed technique is usable and easy to
use for the authentication of a system. It will reduce shoulder surfing attacks. The proposed technique
can be implemented for any device requiring authentication like ATM machines, mobile devices, and
laptops, etc. The results show that the proposed technique is practical in a real-life scenario.
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